Haiti\u27s Post-earthquake Development Paradigm: Is There Potential for Vulnerability Reduction? by Metayer, Guy
Florida International University
FIU Digital Commons
Student Publications Disaster Risk Reduction
1-1-2011
Haiti's Post-earthquake Development Paradigm: Is
There Potential for Vulnerability Reduction?
Guy Metayer
Florida International University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/drr_student
This work is brought to you for free and open access by the Disaster Risk Reduction at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Student Publications by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact dcc@fiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Metayer, G. (2011). Haiti's post-earthquake development paradigm: is there potential for vulnerability reduction? Disaster Risk
Reduction (DRR) Program, Florida International University.
 Haiti’s Post-earthquake Development Paradigm: Is There Potential for Vulnerability 
Reduction? 
 
Guy Metayer 
Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) Program 
Florida International University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted to: 
Dr. Richard S. Olson 
Dr. Juan Pablo Sarmiento 
Dr. Gabriela Hoberman 
 1 
Introduction 
The January 12, 2010 earthquake is the most tragic natural disaster to strike Haiti and one 
of the most disastrous events in the history of humanity. According to the Haitian government, 
more than 300,000 people were killed, as many as 300,000 were injured, and nearly 1 million 
were left homeless as a result of the January earthquake. It is estimated that losses and damages 
caused by the earthquake amount to nearly US$ 7.9 billion, representing approximately 120 
percent of Haiti’s 2009 GDP1. Among other effects, these sad statistics have called upon Haitians 
and the international community to address not only the urgency created by the earthquake, but 
also the long-term needs associated with building a new country. Receptive to this call, the 
Haitian government and its international partners have vowed to turn this tragedy into “a window 
of opportunity,” an opportunity to implement a new development strategy in Haiti. This 
development strategy, entitled the Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti 
(Action Plan), was officially revealed at the Conference of International Donors held at UN 
headquarters in New York on March 31, 2010. This study is an inquiry into the extent to which 
the Action Plan’s development framework departs from previous development paradigms, 
assumed to have contributed to the January 2010 catastrophe. More specifically, I will look at the 
difference, if any, between the post-earthquake development framework and the 1980s/1990s 
development strategy, which has been blamed for exacerbating the problem of massive rural 
migration to Port-au-Prince and increasing the vulnerability of the capital city to natural 
disasters. First, I will explore the theoretical link between the concepts of migration and 
vulnerability. Second, I will present the essence of the 1980s/1990s development strategy. Third, 
                                                     
1
 These statistics are provided by the Haitian government in the official document entitled “Action Plan for National 
Recovery and Development of Haiti,” the framework to be used for Haiti’s rebuilding process. This document can 
be found at the US State Department website: www.state.gov 
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I will summarize the post-earthquake development paradigm. Fourth, I will look at the extent to 
which the new paradigm departs from the 1980s/1990s development strategy. 
Theoretical Link between Migration and Vulnerability 
It is generally assumed that migration, either national or international, is primarily 
explained by push-pull factors. International migration, for instance, tends to be conceived as the 
result of “a series of push factors that lead individuals to decide to leave underdeveloped nations 
and pull factors that attract them to settle in nations with more advanced economies” (DeWind & 
Kinley 1988, p. 138). Nevertheless, the push-pull factors are numerous. In other words, people 
migrate for several reasons. They migrate due to “injustice, exclusion, environmental 
degradation, competition for scarce resources and economic hardship caused by dysfunctional 
states. Some leave voluntarily, some flee because there is no other choice, and some may make 
the decision to move before they have no other choice but to flee” (EU Parliamentary Assembly 
2008, p. 2). The increasingly globalized world has been characterized as giving rise to more 
extensive labor migration. It is contended that “wealth disparities created by our globalized 
economy have fed increased intra-and transnational labor migration as livelihood options 
disappear in less wealthy countries and communities” (Janie 2006, p. 140).  
The relationship between migration and vulnerability is reciprocal. On the one hand, the 
increased vulnerability of some communities may force individuals to migrate to more resilient 
communities. From this standpoint, “migration [is] not just a problem, it is also a solution. 
Migration is not just a failure of adaptation, but can itself be an adaptation strategy” (Swing 
2008, p. 1). On the other hand, massive migration to an area may increase the vulnerability of 
this area. It may increase the level of social vulnerability, which refers to “the characteristics of a 
person or group in terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from the 
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impact of a natural hazard’’ (Myers & al. 2008, p. 273). Overall, it can be said that migration has 
the potential to be “a positive and proactive diversification and development strategy that 
households, individuals, and sometimes whole communities adopt to improve their lives and 
reduce vulnerability, but, mass migration can have negative impacts, including escalating 
humanitarian crisis, rapid urbanization, associated slum growth, and stagnated development” 
(EU Parliamentary Assembly p. 2). In other words, migration is seen as both a “social protection2 
strategy and a leading factor of vulnerabilities that require specific social protection instruments” 
(Sabates-Wheeler & Waite 2003, p. 4).  
The relationship between migration and vulnerability has often been looked at from the 
environmental or climate change perspective. From this perspective, it is asserted that there are a 
growing number of environmental migrants3 in the world. More precisely, “every year 30 million 
people worldwide are forced to move because of serious degradation of environmental 
conditions, natural disasters and depletion of natural resources, and that this figure is expected to 
soar by the middle of this century” (EU Parliamentary Assembly p. 1). Given the complexity of 
the connection between environmental change and migration, scholars advocate that 
policymakers work to better understand this relationship in order to “make informed decisions” 
(Warner & al. 2009, p. iv). They argue that “a better understanding of specific migration 
dynamics and its causal factors is needed to improve the formulation of social policies and 
coping strategies for environmental refugees” (Rozdilsky & Schultink 2008, p. 1). This argument 
is based on the fact that “the impacts of climate change on the environment and human mobility 
                                                     
2
 The concept of social protection is defined as “an agenda primarily for reducing vulnerability and managing the 
risk of low-income individuals, households and communities with regard to basic consumption and social services” 
(Sabates-Wheeler & Waite p. 4). 
3Environmental migrants are defined as “people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily 
or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption….that jeopardized their existence and/or seriously 
affected the quality of their life” ( Afifi & Warner 2008. p. 1). 
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are becoming increasingly worrying and that the number of natural disasters has doubled over 
the past two decades” (EU Parliamentary Assembly p. 1). 
Despite the role that climate change and environmental issues have played in increasing 
the vulnerabilities of communities and migration in general, scholars tend to agree that economic 
and political factors remain “the dominant drivers of displacement and migration” (Warner & al. 
p. iv). This is true, as the paper will show, in the case of Haiti, and particularly its capital city, 
Port-au-Prince. Economic hardship amongst the Haitian peasantry, mostly due to unsound 
development policies, has contributed to massive rural migration, considerably increasing the 
vulnerability of the capital city and largely explaining the sheer magnitude of the January 2010 
disaster. 
By calling for the implementation of a new development framework in Haiti, national and 
international stakeholders are implicitly agreeing that past development policies have an 
explanatory power when it comes to understanding the January 2010 disaster. More specifically, 
they tend to concur that the 1980s/1990s development paradigm implemented in Haiti has 
worsened the country’s demographic problem and increased, as a result, its vulnerability to 
natural disasters. Before establishing the difference, if any, between the new post-earthquake 
development framework and the 1980s/1990s development strategy, it is methodologically sound 
to present the essence of the latter development strategy.  
The 1980s/1990s Development Strategy 
The 1980s development strategy, promoted in Haiti by major international donor 
agencies (including the World Bank WB, the International Monetary Fund IMF, and the U.S. 
Agency for International Development USAID), basically consisted of bypassing the Haitian 
state and shifting Haitian production away from local consumption and towards export. The 
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1980s development strategy “emphasized the fostering of market-oriented approaches to 
development as a major initiative […] and the development of non-traditional exports” 
(USAID/Haiti: Country Development Strategy Statement FY 86, January 1984 p. 24). The 
strategy was based on the premise that Haiti’s economic growth could be brought about by 
“strengthening the private sector and promoting exports” (USAID/Haiti: Revised Strategy Paper 
for FY 89/90, November 1989, p. 17). This development strategy had two essential components: 
the development of agro-industry and the promotion of the assembly industry. While the agro-
industrial plants were established to process export crops, the assembly industry, located in Port-
au-Prince, aimed to perform two main functions: to “provide employment and facilitate the 
absorption of the displaced rural population into urban Port-au-Prince, and provide foreign 
exchange earnings needed to pay for imported foods no longer produced within the country” 
(DeWind & Kinley p. 59). According to the international donor agencies, the export-led 
development strategy was to be structured around what was presumed to be Haiti’s comparative 
advantage, its hard-working and cheap labor force, to make it “the Taiwan of the Caribbean” (p. 
61). The strategy assumes that “U.S. and other foreign markets can absorb Haiti’s production and 
yield earnings that will sustain Haiti’s economic growth” (p. 57). 
However, the 1980s development strategy has had disastrous impacts on the Haitian 
peasantry, exacerbating the problem of massive rural migration to Port-au-Prince and increasing, 
as a result, the vulnerability of the capital city. 
One of the impacts of the development-oriented strategy on the Haitian peasantry was “a 
concentration of land holdings and expansion of plantation[s] to attain economies of scale 
sufficient to supply the new processing plants” (p. 58). More specifically, the export-oriented 
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development strategy contributed to a systematic dispossession of peasant lands in order to 
promote large-scale production for export. 
Another impact of this development strategy on Haiti’s peasantry was the invasion of 
foreign rice into the Haitian market. As a result of the economic liberalization of the 1980s 
development strategy, “the Haitian market soon became flooded with subsidized Miami rice that 
sold for less than the rice produced in Haiti” (Knight & Martinez-Vergne 2005, p. 55). This 
liberalization policy, while enriching a sector of the Haitian elite, was damaging to national 
production and, particularly, poor Haitian rice farmers who could not compete.  Because of this 
policy, “household rice consumption doubled and domestic rice production fell steadily to the 
point that by 1995 Haitian farmers produced only about 50 percent of domestic needs. Rice 
imported from the United States made up the difference” (p. 55).  Haiti became more and more 
dependent on the United States for its rice consumption. “In 1984, Haiti imported 5,000 metric 
tons of rice from the United States, but by 1995 the level reached nearly 200,000 metric tons, 
thereby making Haiti the highest per capita consumer of rice in the Western Hemisphere” (p. 
55). In such an economic environment, Haitian-produced rice simply “could not compete with its 
highly capitalized and high-yield U.S. counterpart, produced on large farms that took advantage 
of economies of scale, favorable government policies, and inexpensive inputs derived from fossil 
fuels to plant, fertilize, control pests, harvest, dry, and ship the product to such far-flung markets 
as Haiti” (Maguire 2009, p. 6). 
The food policies adopted by the international donor agencies to compensate for the 
adverse effects of the export-oriented strategy were equally as damaging to Haitian small 
producers and peasants. While USAID considered its food aid program in Haiti a “basis for 
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replication of successful programs4,” it also asserted that “the importation of foodstuffs as rice, 
cooking oil, soya, and mild powder were undermining the peasantry’s production of corn, millet 
and rice from the Artibonite valley because of their inability to compete with the cheaper 
imports” (Dupuy 1989, p. 181). It is further argued that “peasant rearers and producers of cow 
and goat meats were also being displaced by the importation of cheaper chicken meat from 
Miami” (p. 181).  
Among other factors, the dispossession of peasant lands and the inability of Haitian 
farmers to compete with foreign imports have caused massive rural migration to the capital city, 
Port-au-Prince. As the capital became perceived as the only place of opportunity in the country, 
peasants have migrated there en masse in a quest for jobs in the assembly industry in order to 
survive. Migration from the rural areas of Haiti has caused the population of the capital city “to 
grow more quickly than that of any other part of the nation” (DeWind & Kinley p. 104). It is 
highlighted that “between 1971 and 1976, Haiti’s rural population grew at an annual rate of only 
0.8 percent, while the population of Port-au-Prince expanded at a rate of 5.6 percent a year. By 
1981, the population of Port-au-Prince, which had been 506 thousand in 1971, reached 852 
thousand and its annual rate of growth reached nearly 7 percent” (p. 104). According to the 
World Bank, “among the 1.97 million people added to urban areas between 1982 and 2003, 1.3, 
or two-thirds, went to the West region” where Port-au-Prince is located (World Bank 2007, p. 
10). Built to absorb only approximately half a million people, today Port-au-Prince has a 
population that far exceeds this estimate. According to the 2003 Haitian census, the most recent 
census, the current population of Port-au-Prince is 2,109,516 compared to the general population 
of Haiti, which is 9,923,243 (Institut Haitien de Statistique et d’Informatique (IHSI),  
                                                     
4
 (USAID/Bureau for Food for Peace and Voluntary Assistance May 1986, p. 47) 
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www.ihsi.ht). At this point, Port-au-Prince has become overpopulated and, as a result, extremely 
vulnerable to natural disasters. 
The 1980s export-oriented development strategy can be considered a contributing factor to 
the massive rural migration to Port-au-Prince and the overpopulation of the capital city. It is a 
development strategy that has failed not only Port-au-Prince, in terms of increasing its 
vulnerability, but also the entire country in terms of weakening the Haitian state and disastrously 
affecting the agricultural basis of Haiti’s economy. Curiously, the failure of this development 
strategy has been acknowledged by one of its key promoters, the World Bank. Indeed, in its 2002 
Country Assistance Evaluation (CAE) for Haiti, the World Bank concludes that the US$ 300 
million it disbursed to Haiti during the 1970s and 1980s had “little recorded impact on poverty or 
economic growth, and had caused no improvement of governance” (World Bank-CAE/Haiti, 
2002, p. 15).   
 Despite the failure of the 1980s export-oriented development strategy, international donor 
agencies pursued the same development policies in Haiti during the 1990s. In the context of 
President Jean Bertrand Aristide’s return to power after being overthrown by a military coup in 
September 1991, international agencies, mostly the WB and the IMF, reached an agreement with 
the Aristide government on the continuation of the 1980s export-oriented development strategy. 
This agreement or development paradigm is basically summarized in a document entitled the 
Strategy for Social and Economic Reconstruction (SSER), officially discussed at a meeting held 
in Paris (in August 22, 1994) between Aristide advisers and international donor agencies.    
 Under the SSER agreement, the Aristide government committed to “eliminating the jobs 
of half of the country’s public servants, massively privatizing public services, drastically slashing 
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tariffs and import restrictions, eschewing price and foreign exchange controls, granting 
emergency aid to the export sector, enforcing an open foreign investment policy, creating special 
corporate business courts where the judges are more aware of the implications of their decisions 
for economic efficiency, rewriting corporate laws, limiting the scope of state activity and 
regulation” (Aristide Banks on Austerity p. 1). 
The SSER basically assigns to the private sector and NGOs the key role of promoting 
economic development in Haiti. It considers these entities the engines of Haiti’s economic 
development. In fact, the SSER requires that the Haitian government call upon the private sector 
and NGOs for “both the design and the execution of the relevant programs and economic and 
social policies” (p. 2). To emphasize the predominant role the private sector is to play in 
development, the SSER points out that “the renovated state must focus on an economic strategy 
centered on the energy and initiative of Civil Society, especially the private sector, both national 
and foreign” (p. 4). The SSER requires, in other words, that the Haitian state take the back seat 
and follow the lead of not only the Haitian private sector, but also that of foreign businesses. 
From this standpoint, it is plausible to argue that the SSER was tailored, not only to the interests 
of the Haitian private sector, but also to transnational interests.  
In addition to unequivocally assigning the driver’s seat to the private sector, in terms of 
Haiti’s development process, the SSER recommends the same development policies of the 
1980s, shifting production from local consumption to exportation, essentially déjà-vu. To 
implement this strategy, the SSER asserts that “as a result of the turmoil of the last three years, 
the private sector is virtually bankrupt and thus requires emergency assistance, especially for the 
export sector. Yet, the solid and appropriate policy determinants of long-term growth should be 
 10 
put in place. Haiti is a small, open economy; it should not be a ghetto; it needs to export to 
prosper” (p. 4). 
 Basically, the 1990s SSER represents the same 1980s neoliberal recipe and has, as such, 
produced the same results. Consistent with the 1980s export-oriented development strategy, the 
SSER has discouraged any serious investment in Haiti’s rural economy and has undermined, as a 
result, the productivity of the agricultural sector. According to OECD data, “between 1995 and 
2006, only 7 percent of donor allocations went toward agriculture. In 2007, this dropped to 2 
percent, representing only $12 million out of $624 million of donor support” (Maguire p. 5). One 
of the consequences of this lack of investment in the agricultural sector has been a substantial 
reduction in the amount of food produced by Haitian farmers and peasants. In fact, in 1980 
“Haitian farmers provided from 80 to 90 percent of national food needs, but today they produce 
only about 45 percent of what Haiti eats” (p. 5).  Conforming to the 1980s export-led 
development strategy, the 1990s SSER has reinforced the trend of rural migration to Port-au-
Prince as the incomes of Haitian peasants plummeted considerably and poor farmers could no 
longer survive the hostile economic environment. In an attempt to ensure their survival, Haitian 
peasants have massively migrated to Port-au-Prince and have dramatically increased the 
vulnerability of the capital city, which largely explains the disaster of January 12, 2010. In fact, 
Haitian farmers and peasants reacted to the adverse effects of the export-oriented development 
strategy, implemented since the 1980s/1990s, by seeking opportunities elsewhere, particularly in 
Port-au-Prince. It is argued that “declining prosperity in the countryside juxtaposed with the 
prospect of factory jobs in Port-au-Prince sparked a considerable movement from the land to the 
capital city in the early 1980s. As the exodus continued, the population of the metropolitan area 
exploded, growing from an estimated 763,000 in 1982 to more than 2.5 million today, with 
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75,000 new migrants arriving each year” (p. 6). From this standpoint, the January 2010 disaster 
cannot be explained only by the magnitude of the earthquake. In order to have a comprehensive 
understanding of the January disaster, one has to take into account the vulnerability level of the 
city of Port-au-Prince, which is, in large measure, the result of the implementation of the 
1980s/1990s development strategy. In other words, the development paradigm implemented in 
the country during the 1980s and 1990s represents a critical explanatory factor in understanding 
the catastrophic event that occurred in Haiti on January 12, 2010. 
In calling for the promotion of a new development strategy in the aftermath of the 
January earthquake, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has 
effectively pointed out the adverse effects of the 1980s/1990s development paradigm 
implemented in Haiti. UNCTAD correctly argues that the 1980s/1990s development strategy, 
which consisted of opening the Haitian market to ferocious foreign competition, was damaging 
to Haiti. This development strategy, according to UNCTAD, has destroyed Haiti’s national 
production and undermined the Haitian state. By the same token, the UN agency has called for 
the implementation of a new development paradigm in Haiti. UNCTAD (2010) invites national 
and international stakeholders to look at not only the devastating effects of the earthquake on 
Haiti, but also at thirty years of slow development that preceded the earthquake.  
From UNCTAD’s perspective, the occurrence of the earthquake should be used as an 
opportunity to correct the mistakes of the past and to implement a comprehensive development 
strategy with the potential to promote sustainable economic growth. UNCTAD basically 
advocates a new development approach that aims at rebuilding the capacity of the Haitian state. 
The agency argues that the Haitian state should be the leader of the post-earthquake development 
process and that the new development strategy takes into consideration the capacities and the 
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weaknesses of local communities. More importantly, UNCTAD (2010) asserts that the 
rebuilding process of Haiti should involve a new approach to international cooperation, which 
entails investment in the productive sectors of the country, mobilization of domestic resources, 
and increased agricultural production. This new approach to international cooperation, UNCTAD 
points out, should be all-encompassing in order to allow for job creation and poverty reduction. 
 In addition to UNCTAD, major international donor agencies have also called for the 
implementation of a new development strategy in Haiti. In the aftermath of the January disaster, 
many national and international stakeholders have emphasized the necessity of promoting a new 
development paradigm for the construction of a new country. In fact, the Haitian government and 
its international partners have come up with a development framework entitled the Action Plan 
for National Recovery and Development of Haiti (Action Plan), purported to be different from 
previous development strategies. 
 The Post-earthquake Development Framework (Action Plan) 
The Action Plan framework was officially presented by the Haitian government and 
approved by major international donor countries and agencies on March 31, 2010 at a conference 
of international donors held at UN headquarters in New York. The Action Plan represents the 
framework to be used for Haiti’s rebuilding in the aftermath of the January 12 earthquake. The 
concept of rebuilding utilized in the framework refers to the necessity of addressing all the 
country’s areas of vulnerability, so that “the vagaries of nature or natural disasters never again 
inflict such suffering or cause so much damage and loss” (Action Plan 2010, p. 5). For the 
Haitian government and its international partners, rebuilding does not mean returning Haiti to the 
pre-earthquake situation, but the implementation of a comprehensive strategy to address, once 
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and for all, the issue of under-development in Haiti. The architects of the post-earthquake 
development framework point out that the 2010 Action Plan underlines a vision that “goes 
beyond a response to the losses and damages caused by the earthquake […] It aims to launch a 
number of key initiatives to […] tackle the structural causes of Haiti’s under-development” (p. 
5). It is argued in this development framework that the earthquake has offered an opportunity “to 
unite Haitians of all classes and origins in a shared project to rebuild the country on new 
foundations” (p. 5). From the perspective of its designers, the framework underscores, not only a 
new development strategy for Haiti, but also a new vision for a new country. 
Vision for a New Haiti 
The Haitian government and its international partners claim that the Action Plan lays out 
a new vision of development for Haiti in the context of the post-earthquake rebuilding process. 
This vision to rebuild Haiti “by turning the disaster of January 12, 2010 into an opportunity to 
make it an emerging country by 2030,” will involve: 
A fair, just, united and friendly society living in harmony with its environment and 
culture; a modern society characterized by the rule of law, freedom of association and 
expression and land management; a society with a modern, diversified, strong, dynamic, 
competitive, open and inclusive economy based on the land; a society in which people’s 
basic needs are met quantitatively and qualitative; a knowledge-based society with 
universal access to basic education, mastery of qualifications based on a relevant 
professional training system, and the capacity for scientific and technical innovation fed 
by a modern and efficient university system, in order to create the new type of citizen the 
country needs for reconstruction. All of this, under the supervision of a responsible, 
 14 
unitary state guaranteeing the implementation of laws and the interests of the people with 
a strong commitment to deconcentration and decentralization (p. 8). 
This vision of a new Haiti will be carried out, according to the framework, by an 
international entity responsible for administering the rebuilding process. This entity, called the 
Temporary Committee for Rebuilding Haiti or the Haitian Interim Reconstruction Commission 
(HIRC), aims at becoming, according to the framework, the Agency for the Development of Haiti 
and a Multiple Donor Fiduciary Fund. The main functions of this international entity are to 
“enable the preparation of files, the formulation of programs and projects as well as their 
financing and execution” (p.5). In addition to expressing their post-earthquake development 
vision for Haiti, the stakeholders have also devised a rebuilding plan outlining deadlines to be 
met during the process. 
The Rebuilding Plan 
The rebuilding plan is comprised of three phases: an emergency period, an 
implementation period (18 months), and a ten-year period. 
The emergency period includes the “improvement of accommodation for the homeless; 
the return of pupils to school, students to university and vocational training centers; the 
preparation for the next hurricane season; the pursuit of efforts to restore a sense of normality to 
economic life, especially by creating large numbers of jobs through high-intensity work” (p. 9). 
The implementation period (18 months) involves establishing “a framework of incentives 
and supervision for private investment on which Haiti’s economic growth will be founded […] 
Private investment in the economy as well as in the social sector will form the backbone of the 
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country’s reconstruction” (p. 9). This period will start with “the end of the emergency period and 
the preparation for projects to generate genuine renewal” (Action Plan 2010, p. 5). 
The ten-year period is when “the reconstruction and recovery of Haiti will become a 
reality, in order to put the country back on the road to development, followed by another ten 
years to make it a real emerging country” (p. 9). 
 
The Rebuilding Process  
According to the post-earthquake development framework, Haiti’s rebuilding process 
will involve four key areas: social, institutional, territorial, and economic. 
The social rebuilding entails the establishment of a system of education that “guarantees 
access to education for all children, offers vocational and university education to meet the 
demands of economic modernization, and a health system ensuring minimum coverage 
throughout the country and social protection for the most vulnerable workers” (p. 9). 
In terms of institutional rebuilding, the framework emphasizes the necessity of focusing 
on “making state institutions operational again by prioritizing the most essential functions; 
redefining the Haitian legal and regulatory framework to better adapt it to the requirements of the 
Haitian state; implementing a structure that will have the power to manage reconstruction; and 
establishing a culture of transparency and accountability that deters corruption in the country” (p. 
9).  
When it comes to territorial rebuilding, the framework calls for the identification, 
planning, and management of new development centers. It also calls for “the stimulation of local 
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development, the reconstruction of affected areas, the implementation of economic infrastructure 
required for growth (roads, energy and communication), and the management of land tenure in 
order to protect property and facilitate the advancement of large projects” (p. 8). 
Lastly, the economic rebuilding, according to the framework, consists of “modernizing 
the agricultural sector, developing an export potential in terms of fruits and tubers, livestock, 
farming, and fishing, in the interests of food security; developing the professional construction 
sector with laws and regulations relating to earthquake-resistant and hurricane-resistant materials 
and implementation and control structures; promoting manufacturing industries; and organizing 
the development of tourism” (p. 8). 
 It is worth noting that the Action Plan framework establishes an intimate link between the 
territorial rebuilding and the economic rebuilding of Haiti. It asserts that the two are related and 
simultaneous processes, in that a better redistribution of the population will be facilitated by a 
better redistribution of economic activities all over the country. The framework correctly asserts 
that one of the reasons for the overpopulation of Port-au-Prince, and by extension the catastrophe 
of January 12, is the fact that the capital city has been given disproportionate economic 
importance compared to the rest of the country. To address this issue, the framework calls for the 
promotion of regional development centers and “the construction and management of large 
facilities and infrastructures for production (industrial zones, business free zones, etc) or as an 
aid to production (ports, airports, energy and telecom infrastructure, etc)” (p. 17). The framework 
links the potential success of these regional centers to the development of different sectors of the 
Haitian economy, including the industrial, commercial, and tourist sectors. In this context, it 
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considers the HOPE II law5 an important tool that has the potential to facilitate the development 
of regional centers. According to the framework, the HOPE II law offers the possibility of 
building upon Haiti’s comparative advantages “its workforce, the proximity of the North 
American market, and the know-how of its private sector” (p. 17). In the same context, the 
framework promotes foreign direct investment and calls for a partnership between the public 
sector and both the Haitian and international private sectors. It argues that “facilities must be 
made available to international organizations to stimulate direct investments. [That] in addition 
to negotiations and legal and regulatory measures, the State of Haiti wants to encourage 
investments by supporting the development of industrial parks and free zones” (p. 17). The 
framework further argues that “bankable projects with internal profitability will be funded by 
private equity of national and foreign companies and bank loans with special conditions, and it is 
understood that the State will intervene directly whenever necessary to implement the necessary 
infrastructure and ensure more balanced geographical distribution for job creation” (p. 17).  
In addition to rebuilding the aforementioned four areas, the framework calls for the 
implementation of disaster risk management (DRM) programs and the development of crisis 
management mechanisms throughout the country. More specifically, the framework argues that 
“it is necessary to reduce the vulnerability of the population areas in risk zones: protecting the 
population of areas such as Gonaives, Jacmel, and Cabaret that are traditionally hit by natural 
catastrophes; dredging and rerouting certain rivers and drainage canals; protecting and correcting 
the banks of certain rivers and ravines; building the civil engineering works necessary to cross 
risk zones […] In seismic zones, it is essential to put into place works for preventive dredging of 
                                                     
5
 HOPE II refers to Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act. It is a law passed by 
the U.S. Congress in 2008, which “gives preferential access to U.S. imports of Haitian apparel.” HOPE II represents 
an extension of HOPE I Act, which was passed in 2006. HOPE II Act “extends the preferences for 10 years, expands 
coverage of duty-free treatment to more apparel products, particularly knit articles, and simplifies the rules, making 
them easier to use” (Congressional Research Reports for the People p. 1). 
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drainage, collection and treatment canals and works for stabilization of ravine banks in affected 
zones to prevent catastrophes and to safeguard the remaining private and public infrastructures” 
(p. 15). 
By the same token, the framework calls for the reinforcement of local means of civil 
protection, the readiness of public authorities to face any national crisis, and the establishment of 
risk prevention policies. 
The reinforcement of local means of civil protection involves “training, staff recruitment, 
equipping the community and department personnel, recruitment of a civil safety manager for 
each municipality, recruitment of a coordinator for each department to function under the 
department delegates. For events calling for a national response, the Ministry of the Interior and 
Territorial Communities is to be confirmed as the sole body in charge of operational crisis 
management” (p. 15). 
Reinforcing the public authorities’ readiness involves building the capacity of public 
authorities to effectively handle any crisis that threatens the country whether natural, industrial, 
or technological. As a result of this need, the framework establishes a National Council for Civil 
Protection. This Council, according to the framework, comprises “ministers who are directly 
involved in crisis management […] This will be the political structure for management of major 
crises and their follow-up until the situation returns to normal” (p. 16). 
The risk prevention policies mentioned by the framework involve “delimitation of zones 
at risk, regulation of urban planning, prescription for construction (mainly quake resistant), 
standardization of construction procedures and material, pollution prevention rules, etc.” (p. 16). 
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Lastly, the framework proposes to revise the law on the State of Emergency to enable the 
government to effectively respond to national crises like the January 12, 2010 earthquake.  
 After presenting the post-earthquake development framework, it is curious to assess it in 
terms of the extent to which it departs from the 1980s and 1990s development paradigm. 
 
Assessment of the Post-earthquake Development Framework  
The main strength of the post-earthquake development framework is its emphasis on the 
necessity of decentralizing public services in Haiti. The framework has the virtue of calling for 
the elimination of the “Republic of Port-au-Prince” and the empowerment of other cities. The 
establishment of regional development centers, as pointed out by the framework, is very critical 
to reducing the vulnerability of the capital city and promoting national development. The 
regional development centers would allow for a more equitable distribution of public services 
throughout the country. They would create other places of opportunity and reduce, as a result, the 
flow of rural migration to the capital city, Port-au-Prince. 
Also, the post-earthquake development paradigm has the merit of establishing an intimate 
link between territorial rebuilding and economic rebuilding. Indeed, there can be no viable 
territorial rebuilding without economic rebuilding. A healthy distribution of the population 
throughout the country necessarily involves the creation of economic opportunities in different 
parts of the country. Past lessons teach us that Port-au-Prince had become overpopulated and 
extremely vulnerable to natural disasters mainly because the capital city had been perceived as 
the only place of economic opportunity in the country.   
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The Action Plan also has the virtue of prescribing a systematic incorporation of disaster 
risk management into all aspects of Haiti’s rebuilding process. Given that risk management has 
the potential to reduce the probability of disaster, this prescription can help Haiti avoid numerous 
disasters and strengthen the resilience of its communities. 
However, one has to cast doubts on the framework’s promise of building a better country. 
While the framework considers the private sector “the backbone of Haiti’s reconstruction,” it 
systematically ignores the role of the Haitian state in the reconstruction process. Despite the 
aforementioned virtues of the post-earthquake development framework, it runs the risk of 
committing the same mistakes of the past by weakening the Haitian state. Instead of reforming 
and, at the same time, increasing its capacity, the framework proposes to simply bypass the 
Haitian state. This has been the development strategy implemented in Haiti since the 1980s, a 
strategy responsible for considerably increasing the country’s vulnerability to natural disasters. 
The past thirty years have proven that the private sector, whether national or international, has 
failed in its endeavors to develop Haiti without the direct involvement of a reformed Haitian 
state. It is certainly a fact that the Haitian state has historically been corrupt and ineffective. It is 
also a fact that the private sector, in collaboration with this corrupt state, has developed a system 
of crony capitalism6 in which members of the political and economic elite enrich themselves at 
                                                     
6
 Crony capitalism, in this study, refers to a corrupt alliance between Haitian political and economic elites in order to 
enrich themselves at the expense of the majority of the Haitian people. However, crony capitalism is a very broad 
concept. Scholars look at the concept from different perspectives and provide different insights. Hutchcroft (1991), 
for instance, defines crony capitalism as a way to achieve private accumulation through access to the state apparatus. 
Vaugirard (2005) considers crony capitalism as clientelism, “an economic system in which the allocation of 
resources and the adjudication of commercial disputes are generally made to favor those who have a close 
relationship with political leaders or government officials, by blood (nepotism) or by bribes (corruption)” (p. 77). To 
Femminis and Ruggerone (2004), crony capitalism is all about rescuing, bailing out, and favoring the business 
community by any means. They argue that “in a crony-capitalistic environment, a small fraction of the population, 
often exploiting personal relations with government officials, is able to influence the government’s decisions on 
many important public matters (p. 1). Lastly, Kang (2003) argues that crony capitalism “refers to a number of 
related concepts: family and personal relations, bribery and corruption, patron-client relations, and collusion” (p. 
441). 
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the expense of the majority of the Haitian people. I argue that the cure to the Haitian state’s 
corruption does not reside in bypassing it. The cure is instead linked to a reform and capacity 
building process. The development paradigm applied to Haiti should empower the Haitian state 
to systematically reinvigorate Haiti’s rural economy. More precisely, this development strategy 
should promote major investments in the agricultural sector, secure the land rights of poor 
farmers, and support innovations that increase the productivity of their lands. In brief, there is a 
need to strengthen the capacity of the Haitian state to empower poor Haitian farmers, persuading 
them, as a result, to forgo migrating to the urban centers, particularly Port-au-Prince, en masse.   
More importantly, many of the useful prescriptions of the framework can hardly be 
executed without the direct involvement of the Haitian state. For instance, the framework’s calls 
for decentralization and incorporation of disaster risk management into Haiti’s development 
process can only become a reality through the power of the state. In other words, decentralization 
and systematic disaster risk management are fundamentally political processes whose successful 
implementation requires direct state involvement.  
 
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, it can be argued that the 1980s/1990s development paradigm implemented 
in Haiti has considerably increased the country’s vulnerability, particularly by encouraging 
massive rural migration to its capital city, Port-au-Prince. Among other effects, this development 
paradigm has contributed to the overpopulation of Port-au-Prince, a factor, in large measure, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
 22 
responsible for the scale of the January 2010 disaster. The post-earthquake development 
framework, adopted by the Haitian government and major international donor countries and 
agencies, has the virtue of addressing some of the flaws of the 1980s/1990s development 
paradigm. Contrary to the 1980s/1990s development policies, the post-earthquake framework 
accurately emphasizes the necessity of decentralizing public services, promoting economic 
opportunities in different regions of the country, and systematically incorporating disaster risk 
management into all aspects of the reconstruction process. Nevertheless, the post-earthquake 
framework, I argue, has the potential to be the main obstacle to the execution of its own 
prescriptions because it has failed to address the necessity of reforming the Haitian state and 
increasing its capacity. This argument is based on the fact that decentralization and systematic 
disaster risk management, two main prescriptions of the framework, are fundamentally political 
processes whose successful implementation requires direct state involvement.  In choosing to 
bypass the Haitian state and assigning the driver’s seat of Haiti’s development process to the 
private sector, the post-earthquake development framework runs the risk of repeating the same 
mistakes of the past and perpetuating Haiti’s “failed state” status. 
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